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Understanding corruption through the analysis of court case content: research note
ABSTRACT
Crime records have been discarded as a reliable measurement tool of corruption due to the 
fact that certain offences may go unreported and unrecorded. We move away from the 
intractable debate of the “dark figures” to concentrate our attention on the usefulness of court 
records to the study of corruption. We have analysed 838 court cases on corruption and related 
offences recorded in Portuguese First Instance Courts for the period 2004-2008. The available 
evidence is rich in quantitative and qualitative information both on the anatomy of corruption 
as a criminal offence and the judicial system’s capacity to investigate, prosecute and trial 
reported occurrences. This dataset provides an original set of variables that not only 
characterises the volume and distribution of corruption and related offences across the country, 
but it also gives insight on the corrupt exchanges and their processual features.
KEYWORDS
corruption; court cases; dataset; Portugal
1. INTRODUCTION: ON THE LIMITATIONS OF CRIME STATISTICS TO 
MEASURE THE EXTENSION OF CORRUPTION
Corruption is an intractable multidimensional policy problem with financial and reputational 
implications for both public and private institutions that requires a knowledge-based control 
approach. In order to address it with specific policy actions and instruments, it is important to 
know what we are fighting and how much of it there is by using different approaches and 
sources of information (Hansen & Stachowicz-Stanusch, 2013).































































The difficulties to address these problems were the main reason for coming up with a new 
dataset on corruption cases. The dataset we present in this research note is a novelty not only 
because of the extensive coding work that it entailed, but also, because it gives access to micro-
information and characterisation of court cases of corruption for a several years period of time 
(2004-2008).
Datasets on corruption are not easy to find. Indicators to define and measure corruption are 
often classified in two groups (Lambsdorff, 2006; Langseth, 2006; Galtung, 2006): subjective 
and objective. Subjective data has been primarily collected through survey techniques 
nationally1 and cross-nationally.2 The two most cited cross-national measurements of 
corruption, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI)3 and the Control 
of Corruption indicator of the World Governance Indicators (WGI) (Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., 
& Mastruzzi, 2009), use perception-based data. Objective indicators of corruption are primarily 
collected from official records on crime rates, such as the number of investigations, 
prosecutions, trials and convictions per type of criminal offence.
The dataset here presented uses the second type of information. However, we are aware that 
reliable statistical data is hard to get and when it exists it is not easily comparable across 
countries for a number of reasons. First, the credibility of official statistics varies across 
countries and over time for various reasons, ranging from data reporting/collection 
insufficiencies, methodological issues, and budget sustainability to ensure the existence of time 
series. The way crime statistics are organised, the type and quality of information collected and 
coded, the period covered and how the data is presented and made available to the public can 
1 See, for example, Mancuso, Atkinson, Blais, Greene, & Nevitte, 1998; Miller, Grodeland, & Koshechkina, 2001; Redlawks & 
McGann, 2005; De Sousa & Triães, 2008; Mazzoleni & Lascoumes, 2010.
2 See, for example, Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer, the European Commission’s Special and Flash 
Eurobarometers on Corruption.
3 Transparency International. 2012. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2012: An updated methodology.” 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/in_detail/.































































be an obstacle to research. Second, crime statistics are likely to be a reflection, not only of a 
country’s corruption levels, but also of two intertwined aspects of control (Cazzola, 1988: 22): 
(1) the dominant reporting culture, which is a result of both the existence or absence of adequate 
whistleblowing procedures and mechanisms as well as the degree of permissiveness towards 
corruption; and (2) the existing institutional capacity and willingness to repress corruption, i.e. 
an efficient auditing and judicial system, to detect, investigate, prosecute, trial and eventually 
condemn corrupt conducts. For instance, “[a]n increase in the number of corruption cases 
brought to trial could indicate a higher incidence of corruption, an increased level of confidence 
in the court, or both.” (June, Chowdhury, Heller, & Werve, 2008: 14)
Either because certain practices may have become a norm or because the judicial authorities 
demonstrate limited capacity or selective enforcement bias (Cazzola, 1988: 23) in dealing with 
complex crime, certain offences may go unreported and unrecorded in official statistics. These 
are the so-called “dark figures” of corruption (Piquero and & Albanese, 2011: 194), a suspected 
volume of corruption that falls under the radar of judicial authorities, making official figures 
look discrepant with observable social practices and organizational risks. Detection let alone 
prosecution or conviction of corruption can be extraordinarily difficult given the complex and 
obscure nature of these illicit exchanges (De Sousa, 2002).
Therefore, crime statistics may tell more about the efficiency and efficacy of the judicial sphere 
in defining, uncovering and prosecuting acts of corruption than the volume of manifestations 
in a particular political or administrative system (Mény, 1992: 219). A country that displays 
high figures on corruption may not necessarily be indicative of being “more corrupt”, but more 
efficient in curbing its occurrence in society. 
Third, there is also a time gap between the occurrences of corrupt conducts and their 
prosecution and/or conviction. This will be inevitable reflected in the way crime statistics are 
coded and presented. The prosecution of corruption is not an easy or expeditious process and 































































tends to become more complex when the offender is a political figure. Judicial proceedings can 
last for many years until a final decision is reached, given the difficulty of gathering and 
interpreting evidence and the possibility of appeals suspending execution deadlines at different 
stages of the judicial proceedings thus delaying court’s final decision. This means that crime 
statistics will always display a hiatus between input and output objective indicators and 
therefore can only offer a very fragmented picture of the extension of corruption (as a criminal 
offence) in a given country.
Fourth, there is also a problem regarding the taxonomy of corruption as a criminal offence 
(Cazzola, 1988; De Sousa, 2002; Piquero & Albanese, 2011). Penal frameworks/laws vary 
across countries thus making it difficult to compare the volume of occurrences across different 
jurisdictions. When confronting statistical figures without paying due attention to the existing 
conceptual specificities of the offences, comparison (even if by juxtaposition) runs the risk of 
becoming spurious. The degree in which judicial action is framed will affect the extent in which 
crime statistics are more or less representative of those grey areas falling in the borderline of 
legality.
For all these reasons, attempts at developing cross-national measurements on corruption using 
official crime statistics have been systematically discredited (June et al., 2008: 14) or simply 
abandoned in favour of subjective approaches, which also have their limitations (Piquero & 
Albanese, 2011: 197). Nowadays, very few studies incorporate ‘objective measurement 
methodologies of corrupt activities’ (Brooks, Walsh, Lewis, & Kim, 2013: 28), despite recent 
noteworthy efforts (Escresa & Picci, 2017). Escresa and Picci (2017) have used judicial 
statistics on cross-border corruption, i.e. bribery between firms headquartered in a particular 
country and foreign public officials, to construct and compute a valid cross-national corruption 
index: the Public Administration Corruption Index (PACI).































































Our approach regarding the usefulness of objective indicators provided by court records is 
slightly different. We are not interested in measuring corruption per se but interpreting ‘the way 
corruption as a criminal offence has been treated through repressive instruments […] over a 
period of time’ by using court case narratives (De Sousa, 2002: 267). Court records are not just 
abstract statistics. These figures relate to concrete cases and judicial decisions that give detailed 
and objective indication as to who, what, when, where, why, and how the rules were broken 
(Chapman & Lindner 2016).
In this research note we attempt to explore the relevance of judicial materials. We focus on 
court cases to understand the sociology of corruption as a criminal offence, or to learn from the 
judicial system’s capacity to investigate, prosecute and trial reported occurrences. The data is 
available for open consultation at the Portuguese Archive of Social Information (APIS).4 
2. THE ANALYSIS AND CODING OF COURT CASES: A THREE-DIMENSIONAL 
APPROACH 
The analysis and respective coding of court cases is, by no means, simple or trivial. 
Systematically reading and coding texts, in order to identify consistent features and drawing 
inferences about their use and meaning are both time-consuming and expensive research tasks. 
The collection of court cases on a particular type of criminal offence is something that it is not 
within reach for most researchers, either because cases are not properly recorded and classified 
in online and thus broadly available databases or, to a more limited extent, because some case-
law information is confidential and cannot be disclosed by law or by court rule.
4 Online access to the dataset, codebook and final report is available at: http://www.apis.ics.ulisboa.pt/en/































































The literature analysing the content of court cases and judicial opinions has grown considerably 
over the past forty years. US scholars have led the way. This approach has been used to study 
a broad range of issues in different legal subject areas (Hall & Wright, 2008: 70): (1) the 
creation of Lexis and Westlaw, the two largest databases on case law, statutes, codes, public 
records, law journals, legal treatises and other judicial documents; and (2) the development of 
computational tools and machine learning classifiers, which facilitated and automated the 
transcription, coding/labelling and interpretation of texts. 
Our study is a contribution to this line of research. The project included an analysis of 838 court 
cases on corruption and related offences recorded in First Instance Courts for the period 2004-
2008 in Portugal.
The two main objectives of this project were to advance knowledge about the way corruption 
and related offences are structured and operate in society and to draw inferences on the 
efficiency and efficacy of the judicial authorities in handling reported offences with the ultimate 
goal of improving and effecting control policies.
The data collected and coded enabled us to understand the reported crime of corruption and 
related offences at three levels of analysis:
[Figure 1 about here]
3. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
Before discussing selectively some of the results obtained in this study, it is useful to review 
some methodological aspects related to the collection and processing of information.
































































This dataset is the outcome of a pilot project commissioned by the 
Central Department of Criminal Investigation and Prosecution 
(CDCIP) of the Portuguese Attorney-General’s Office. Although 
the period covered (2004-2008) was determined by the project’s 
funding programme, it was nevertheless a very interesting time 
span to study corruption in Portugal, since it coincided with a 
set of changes in the legal provisions and instruments to fight 
corruption5 and the launching of a series of criminal 
investigations on political corruption and large scale banking fraud 
under the coordination of the CDCIP. Given that the CDCIP has 
access to all relevant cases from First Instance Courts, we 
counted with all the official cases, not having to deal with 
sampling biases. All court cases on corruption and similar 
offences recorded in First Instance Courts, from 2004 until 2008, 
were included in this database.
Nevertheless, we had to define a set of criteria for delimiting our universe of analysis. We 
included all processes, regardless of their procedural stage at the time of analysis (i.e. 
investigation, prosecution, instruction/pre-trial, trial, appeal or closure).
5 Seventeen new projects of law on corruption were presented and debated in parliament during the 10th legislature (2005-2009), 
the highest number of draft bills registered so far. This period also coincided with the ratification of the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption. Several draft bills had to do with the transposition of international treaty provisions and other European Union 
legal norms in the domain of the fight against corruption.































































The universe of analysis covers information collected from court cases, available in the 
country’s 255 judicial counties organized in four districts6 – Lisbon, Oporto, Coimbra and 
Évora – annually for the years 2004 to 2008. A total of 838 court cases were considered (table 
1), distributed among the three types of criminal offences under scrutiny: corruption (active and 
passive), economic participation in business and embezzlement (illegal misappropriation or 
misuse of entrusted assets). In 141 cases, there were facts that integrated simultaneously two or 
three types of criminal offences.
[Table 1 about here]
For the period of analysis, the total number of complaints (979) showed the following 
distribution: 531 allegations of corruption, 43 of economic participation in business and 356 of 
embezzlement. With regard to the parties involved in the proceedings, a total of 941 defendants 
(natural and legal persons, active and passive) were enrolled. With regard to natural persons 
identified in the proceedings, it was decided to treat only those individuals formally constituted 
as defendants. In relation to legal persons, all parties were included, irrespective of whether or 
not they had been formally constituted as defendants, in order to overcome disparities resulting 
from the criminal liability regimes applicable to legal persons during the period under review. 
Since the penal responsibility of legal persons only came into force with the Law 59/2007, this 
would exclude from the universe of analysis all court cases in which companies had been 
involved prior to 2007.
6 With the Law 62/2013, of August 26 (Law of the Organization of the Judicial System), a new judicial map of Portugal was 
adopted. Under this new judicial reform, the former territorial organisation of courts was replaced by 23 new large judicial districts, 
which coincide, in most cases, with the existing administrative districts.































































Given that the study focused on the analysis of court cases on corruption and related criminal 
offences reported to First Instance Courts, it was necessary to clarify our object of analysis. In 
strict legal terms, an agent can only be considered to have committed a particular crime after a 
final and unappealable decision in a court of law. So, to avoid linguistic misunderstandings, 
when we use the term “corruption and related criminal offences” we are referring to 
occurrences/facts that gave rise to criminal proceedings. Public prosecutors come to knowledge 
of crime related facts by their own means, via reports from investigative and auditing authorities 
or as a result of public complaints (Article 241 of the Portuguese Criminal Procedure Code, 
henceforth CPC). This gives rise to the opening of an investigation by the Public Prosecutor 
(Article 262 CPC), which will then either dismiss the case or file an indictment. The case, if 
instructed at the pre-trial phase, will then be brought to a trial stage, which will then result in 
either conviction or acquittal of the natural or legal persons charged.
3.2. The coding of cases
Three methodological steps were given consideration when coding the cases: the selection of 
indicators; the training of coders; and the actual coding of cases.
i) Selecting indicators
A tentative set of coding categories was created a priori through an iterative discussion with 
senior prosecutors and colleagues working in the field. The draft list of indicators (see Table 1 
below) focused on concrete case-law elements and the respective set of coding instructions. 































































The multi-dimensional analytical framework adopted allowed to identify and classify, four 
types of information that could be obtained and coded from reading and interpreting the court 
case narratives:
1) Information about the corrupt act – The characterization of the criminal act was based on 
the following variables: the date of the reported occurrence; the place where the corrupt 
exchange took place; the number of corrupt agents involved in the exchange; their motivations 
and objectives; the resources/amounts used or promised as inducements; the illicit advantages 
promised or obtained; the mode of engagement etc.
2) Information about the corrupt agents – The corrupt agents were grouped into four categories: 
active and passive legal person and active and passive natural person. The first categories refer 
to crimes allegedly committed by companies and public bodies; whereas the second to crimes 
allegedly committed by individuals (private agents or office holders). Whereas for the first 
group, we coded information regarding the nature and type of organization, its mission and 
sector of activity, for the second group we retained all the necessary information that enabled 
us to characterise the corrupt agents according to standard sociographic variables;.
3) Information about the complaint – Corruption, as a criminal offence, is a hidden pact. The 
reporting of facts conducive to criminal investigations is quintessential to the detection of 
corruption. In order to characterize the context or circumstance that gives rise to such public 
denunciation of criminal acts, we tried to retain procedural information about the complaint 
itself (where and to whom the complaint was filled, reason for the complaint, how the complaint 
was made, etc.);.
4) Information on the dynamics of criminal proceedings – Lastly, the framework for analysis 
comprised a set of indicators relating to procedural dynamics, which enabled us to assess: the 
status of the case, i.e., with dated for various stages of the criminal proceedings; the reasons 































































that led to case dismissal and acquittal in the First Instance courts; and the type of sanction 
applied.
ii) Training coders
Given the technical nature of the materials at hand, and in order to reinforce coding reliability, 
we opted to combine coding experience with legal expertise (Hall & Wright, 2008: 110).
The team of coders included four researchers with different disciplinary backgrounds – one 
principal researcher with legal training and three graduate students (two in sociology and one 
in political science) with coding practice and advanced knowledge in statistical methods – 
working under the direct supervision of the two project coordinators, a CDCIP’s senior 
prosecutor and a research fellow in political science. 
Coders were given initial training to ensure a consistent categorisation of content. We also 
carried out regular meetings and a few reliability checks by asking the two researchers to code 
the same court cases, in order to assess whether they were interpreting and following the coding 
protocol in a consistent manner (Lacy, Watson, Riffe, & Lovejoy, 2015: 13).
iii) Coding
Cases were identified and coded by their court reference number. The cases were then classified 
according to three most expressive types of criminal offences under scrutiny (active and passive 
corruption, economic participation in business and embezzlement).
The court case narratives were read, interpreted and coded according to the following analytical 
framework (table 2):































































[Table 2 about here]
Since most indicators concerned only factual information on the attributes of the corrupt 
exchange and on specific procedural aspects, not covering issues pertaining to legal doctrine or 
judicial method, tracking down this information and classifying it according to the codebook 
was a lengthy task with few difficulties. 
4. THE ANALYSIS OF CASES CODED: MOST RELEVANT FINDINGS
There are two main types of data that may be extracted and analysed from these datasets: (1) 
general information (descriptive) of the volume and distribution of corruption and related 
criminal offences; and (2) systematized and codified information resulting from the 
interpretation of court case narratives.
The first dataset maps the distribution of court cases on corruption and similar offences over 
time, jurisdictionally (across judicial districts and counties), and by sector of activity of the 
passive and active corrupt agents. 
The second dataset provides systematized and codified information that enables to (1) 
understand corruption as a criminal offence (its context, actors, resources, and mechanisms of 
exchange); and (2) highlight specific issues regarding the dynamics of criminal proceedings, 
such as the average duration of investigations, the type of reporting practices and the extent to 
what which extent these are likely to impact on procedural efficiency and judicial outcomes. 
Our main descriptive findings illustrate the relevance of this type of datasets for a knowledge-
based and integrated corruption control policy approach.































































4.1. The volume and distribution of corruption and related crimes
Let us begin with the distribution of court cases. Almost all cases of corruption and related 
criminal offences in Portugal concern illegal exchanges between the public and private spheres. 
This finding came as no surprise, since the OECD has systematically criticized Portuguese 
judicial authorities for not clarifying and using the corporate liability provisions to fight 
corruption under the 1997 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions.7
Financial impropriety deriving from a conflict of interest (crime of “economic participation in 
business by a public official”) and facilitation payments (crime of “corruption for a lawful 
conduct”) are practically non-existent. In the first case, this may be related to the way this 
criminal offence is framed and in the second case, it is probably a consequence of the high 
degree of social tolerance in relation to this practice, as demonstrated by a survey study on 
corruption and ethics in public life conducted to a sample of the Portuguese population in 2006 
(De Sousa & Triães, 2008).
We were also able to observe, for the period in question, an increase in criminal offences with 
lower complexity, such as embezzlement, which is often more easily detectable by forensic 
audits in detriment of more complex cases of corruption or financial impropriety. This 
observation seems to contradict prima facie the hypothesis of improved repressive capacity in 
dealing with this type of criminality.
7 OECD (2015) Portugal: Follow-Up to the Phase 3 report & Recommendations. November 2015. Available online: 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Portugal-Phase-3-Written-Follow-Up-Report-ENG.pdf (accessed on January 14, 2019).































































It was possible to observe a north-south divide regarding the jurisdictional distribution of cases 
by type of crime (figure 2).
[Figure 2 about here]
Notwithstanding the judicial map does not coincide with the political map of the country, it still 
is observable an uneven distribution of corruption cases across the 308 municipalities (Figure 
2). The lighter areas are those with higher incidence of corruption. A quick overview of the 
data distribution across the whole map suggests that the northwest municipalities are those most 
targeted by corruption. However, if we take a closer look at the data, it becomes clearer that the 
municipalities with higher incidence of corruption cases are coincidental with two largest cities: 
Lisbon, with 78 cases, and Oporto, with 72 cases. This is not surprising for two reasons: (1) the 
distribution of resources and expertise across the prosecutor’s offices is uneven, with a greater 
specialization on complex crimes concentrated in the prosecutor offices of Lisbon, Porto and 
Coimbra; and (32) these two metropolitan areas concentrate the higher percentage of public 
officials, population  and businesses.
The two judicial districts of the north and centre of Portugal, i.e., Oporto and Coimbra 
respectively, displayed the highest number of cases of corruption, while the two judicial 
districts of the South, Lisbon and Évora, registered the highest number of cases of 
embezzlement. We are not in a position to gauge whether or not this t end is verifiable over 
time, but it is an interesting pattern that must be interpreted in conjunction with other 
governance indicators, such as the quality of regulatory frameworks. Much of the corruption 
cases that took place in the metropolitan area of Oporto, involved municipalities and 
construction companies and had to do with rapid urban sprawl and land management policies. 
The fact that embezzlement figures are higher in Lisbon could be related to the fact that most 
central administration services and public companies are located in this metropolitan area. But 
these are mere speculative conjectures.































































4.2. The anatomy of corruption and related crimes
The sociographic profile of the individual actors was not indicative of any pattern or prevalent 
feature that would allow the construction of a “facial composite” of the corrupt agent. 
According to our dataset, the passive corrupt agent has the profile of a common citizen and this 
is valid for all types of criminal offences analysed. Nevertheless, some patterns were identified 
that may be worth exploring in future studies: the majority of defendants were middle-aged 
male employees, with a permanent position and some decisional power. Corruption is an abuse 
of entrusted power, often of a decisional nature. Hence, it is not surprising that those public 
officials with discretionary and concentrated decisional capacity on the interpretation of norms 
and allocation of goods and services, in a context of poor supervision and organizational ethics 
(Klitgaard, 1988), may seek to take their chances and act illegally. Abrupt changes in the 
lifestyle of the defendant were one of the reasons for engaging in rent-seeking behaviour. 
Individuals more exposed to household financial impairments were also more likely to act 
corruptly.
Court data also allowed us to gauge the areas or sectors of activity more exposed to corruption 
risks. Generally speaking, these tend to be those areas or sectors characterized by high levels 
of informality and clientelism, high profitability ratios deriving from political decisions, 
unbalanced supply-demand of decisional goods and services, disorganized and fragmented 
regulation, low levels of transparency and insufficient or misguided supervision.
During the period under review, most occurrences were related to corruption cases involving 
small monetary exchanges (below EUR 1,500 for almost 40% of cases). There were, however, 
some cases of greater complexity, involving amounts above EUR 50,000. Most corrupt acts 
resulted from state-market interactions and were pursued by the legal representative of an 































































organization with the intent to obtain or retain business or a competitive advantage. For the 
majority of case analysed (52.5%), the private agent was the initiator of the corrupt exchange, 
which seems to confirm the indication by victimisation surveys that the problem of corruption 
in Portugal does not result from predatory practices by public officials.
Most bribery exchanges are pursued in a reserved context that ensures anonymity to both parties 
to the transaction, but in more complex cases, some degree of socialisation between the actors 
was needed before sealing the pact. Meetings outside the workplace often took place discretely 
in selective restaurants and bars or more openly in places of mass concentration of people, such 
as shopping moles malls, due to the functional anonymity they offer to the parties involved.
4.3. Evidence on judiciary performance
The data suggests a pattern of judiciary performance across a large number of cases without 
necessarily raising a discussion of the legal doctrine and judicial reasoning that presided the 
court’s decision for each case in particular. Accordingly, most interventions were not initiated 
as a result of a risk assessment or forensic audit, which means that repression is reactive, 
casuistic, dependent on whistleblowing as a source of information and detached from 
prevention.
Most corruption allegations were reported anonymously, without documentary support, thus 
partly explaining the high rates of case dismissal. Whistleblowing is largely dependent on the 
degree of tolerance towards corruption in a given society and/or organisational context as well 
as the adequacy of reporting mechanisms. The way in which the judicial system collects, and 
processes complaints offers very few guarantees of protection to whistle-blowers. The judicial 
authorities encourage the complainants to file written and identifiable statements in order to 
avoid being charged with slander. Fearing reprisals (De Sousa & Triães 2008), complainants 































































opt to send anonymous letters to the authorities with insufficient evidence (De Sousa & Triães 
2008). 
Most cases were closed without further action (53.1%);. only Only a handful led to conviction 
(6.9%) and fewer led to an effective prison sentence. Although other factors may concur to the 
explanation of the poor record of condemnation of corruption-related offences in Portugal, the 
inadequacy of reporting practices and procedures appears to be a relevant determinant. In fact, 
the court narratives confirm that in cases where the complaint is complemented by 
documentary, audio, video and photographic evidences collected by special investigative means 
(such as lawful interception of communications, computer forensics, access to bank accounts, 
letters rogatory to foreign jurisdictions), the subsequent production of proof in court is more 
effective.
The data also shows that cases reported from inside the organisation where the offence takes 
place are likelier to reach the trial phase, thus reinforcing the need for diversifying and 
strengthening reporting mechanisms and procedures and the guarantees to those who are willing 
to collaborate with the auditing and investigative authorities.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This research note introduces a novel dataset on corruption court cases in Portugal. The policy 
significance of this dataset is threefold: (1) it provides decision-makers a more detailed 
mapping of the volume and distribution of corruption and related offences across the country 
than that provided by standard judicial statistics; (2) it fosters knowledge on key sociological 
aspects of the corrupt fact, thus helping decision-makers to understand better the type of actors, 
objectives, contexts, resources and exchanges involved; (3) it helps to understand the dynamics 































































of judicial proceedings and how certain procedural and institutional features impact on 
outcomes.
The dataset offers a unique characterisation of the legal offences from formal complains to their 
indictment in first instance courts; hence it looks at specific factual elements within legal texts 
that enable to discern patterns across cases.
There are limits as to how much can we infer about the efficiency and efficacy of the judicial 
system in addressing corruption and similar offences through an analysis of the court cases. 
This type of analysis does not enable to distil and interpret the legal principles and judicial 
method a case embodies. For such a fine-grained analysis we suggest a case study approach of 
selective court cases covering in more detail the judicial method and argumentative techniques 
used, the normative sources cited and the interpretations of the social relevance of the offence(s) 
expressed in the final decisions. 
The academic and policy relevance of empirical studies on court case narratives, in particular 
judicial decisions, is known and has largely been discussed in the literature (Jordan, 1998): not 
only it produces descriptive information about what type of corruption related offences the 
judicial system is able to detect, prosecute and trial; it also provides useful insights of judicial 
performance and procedural dynamics that help to tentatively answer bigger policy questions 
and uncover issues for further research.
This type of analysis is of particular importance for judicial authorities or specialised anti-
corruption agencies with investigative and/ inquiry coordination competences since it treats in 
a systematic manner relevant qualitative information about the crime of corruption and related 
offences that official statistics fail to capture, taking as its starting point the criminal 
proceedings, relegating to the background fruitless discussions about the “actual” volume of 
corruption. Firstly, the data enables judicial authorities to enhance their investigative, 































































coordination and prevention capacity by offering case-by-case statistical information on 
corruption and related offences. Secondly, it is also useful for reporting purposes, both 
internally and externally, in response to specific requests for criminal information from 
international bodies and foreign judicial cooperation arrangements. Thirdly, it fosters the 
production of policy-oriented scientific knowledge for repression and prevention purposes. Last 
but not least, it helps to raise standards of transparency and accountability of the judiciary and 
contribute, when complemented with a proactive communication and educational strategy, to 
enhance the public’s understanding and trust in the judicial system.
The dataset has been used by recent studies on corruption. Stockemer & Calca (2013) used 
some of the variables of this dataset to study the relationship between turnout and corruption at 
the municipal level. Lima (2011), using a subsample of 345 criminal proceedings and 352 
defendants presented to the courts between 2004 and 2008, explored the anatomy of corruption 
in local government. 
We believe that this type of data collection, treatment and analysis should be encouraged across 
European Union Member States, where there has been an unprecedented effort of 
harmonization of penal norms and convergence of judicial performance, and other territorial 
areas. Such data would enable policymakers to have a better understanding of the nature of 
corruption as a crime as well as the efficiency of the judicial system in detecting, prosecuting, 
judging and eventually condemning its occurrence, thus contributing to restoring citizens’ 
confidence in the rule of law as well as strengthening the Member States’ governance reputation 
and the fair operation of the iInternal mMarket.
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FIGURE 1 Structure of the Dataset
GENERAL TRENDS
 Total and geographic distribution of corruption cases;
 Total and geographic distribution of corruption related
offences;
 Total cases’ distribution by type of public services,
districts, sectors of activity, etc.
SOCIOLOGICAL CHARACTERISATION
 Type of actors;
 Objectives;
 Contexts of interaction;
 Resources involved;
 Exchange mechanisms, etc.
DYNAMICS OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
 Type of reporting procedure;
 Length of proceedings;
 Status of limitation;
 Resources involved, etc.






























































TABLE 1 Distribution of court cases by type of criminal offence (2004-2008)
Corruption Economic advantage in 
public office















































































FIGURE 2 Map of Corruption Cases by Municipality






























































TABLE 2 List of indicators





Characterization of the corrupt act 
(licit or illicit)
Objectives of the corrupt act
Corrupt payment/reward involved
Moment in which the payment is made
Initiator of corrupt exchange
Context of corrupt exchange








Where was the complaint made

























Type of contractual employment 
relationship








Date of closing the case without further action
Where was the case closed without 
further action




Type of decision (conviction, 
acquittal, annulment)
Type of sanction
Appeal to the Court of Appeal (yes/no)
Date of decision
Type of decision (conviction, 
acquittal, annulment)
Type of sanction
Appeal to the Supreme Court of Justice (yes/no)
Date of decision
Type of decision (conviction, 
acquittal, annulment)
Type of sanction
Appeal to the Constitutional Court (yes/no)
Date of decision
Type of decision (conviction, 
acquittal, annulment)
Type of sanction































































Understanding corruption through the analysis of court case content: research note
ABSTRACT
Crime records have been discarded as a reliable measurement tool of corruption due to the 
fact that certain offences may go unreported and unrecorded. We move away from the 
intractable debate of the “dark figures” to concentrate our attention on the usefulness of court 
records to the study of corruption. We have analysed 838 court cases on corruption and related 
offences recorded in Portuguese First Instance Courts for the period 2004-2008. The available 
evidence is rich in quantitative and qualitative information both on the anatomy of corruption 
as a criminal offence and the judicial system’s capacity to investigate, prosecute and trial 
reported occurrences. This dataset provides an original set of variables that not only 
characterises the volume and distribution of corruption and related offences across the country 
but also gives insight on the corrupt exchanges and their processual features.
KEYWORDS
corruption; court cases; dataset; Portugal
1. INTRODUCTION: ON THE LIMITATIONS OF CRIME STATISTICS TO 
MEASURE THE EXTENSION OF CORRUPTION
Corruption is an intractable multidimensional policy problem with financial and reputational 
implications for both public and private institutions that requires a knowledge-based control 
approach. In order to address it with specific policy actions and instruments, it is important to 
know what we are fighting and how much of it there is by using different approaches and 
sources of information (Hansen & Stachowicz-Stanusch, 2013).































































The difficulties to address these problems were the main reason for coming up with a new 
dataset on corruption cases. The dataset we present in this research note is a novelty not only 
because of the extensive coding work that it entailed, but also, because it gives access to micro-
information and characterisation of court cases of corruption for several years (2004-2008).
Datasets on corruption are not easy to find. Indicators to define and measure corruption are 
often classified in two groups (Lambsdorff, 2006; Langseth, 2006; Galtung, 2006): subjective 
and objective. Subjective data has been primarily collected through survey techniques 
nationally1 and cross-nationally.2 The two most cited cross-national measurements of 
corruption, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI)3 and the Control 
of Corruption indicator of the World Governance Indicators (WGI) (Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi, 2009), use perception-based data. Objective indicators of corruption are primarily 
collected from official records on crime rates, such as the number of investigations, 
prosecutions, trials and convictions per type of criminal offence.
The dataset here presented uses the second type of information. However, we are aware that 
reliable statistical data is hard to get and when it exists it is not easily comparable across 
countries for a number of reasons. First, the credibility of official statistics varies across 
countries and over time for various reasons, ranging from data reporting/collection 
insufficiencies, methodological issues, and budget sustainability to ensure the existence of time 
series. The way crime statistics are organised, the type and quality of information collected and 
coded, the period covered and how the data is presented and made available to the public can 
be an obstacle to research. Second, crime statistics are likely to be a reflection, not only of a 
1 See, for example, Mancuso, Atkinson, Blais, Greene, & Nevitte, 1998; Miller, Grodeland, & Koshechkina, 2001; Redlawks & 
McGann, 2005; De Sousa & Triães, 2008; Mazzoleni & Lascoumes, 2010.
2 See, for example, Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer, the European Commission’s Special and Flash 
Eurobarometers on Corruption.
3 Transparency International. 2012. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2012: An updated methodology.” 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/in_detail/.































































country’s corruption levels, but also of two intertwined aspects of control (Cazzola, 1988: 22): 
(1) the dominant reporting culture, which is a result of both the existence or absence of adequate 
whistleblowing procedures and mechanisms as well as the degree of permissiveness towards 
corruption; and (2) the existing institutional capacity and willingness to repress corruption, i.e. 
an efficient auditing and judicial system, to detect, investigate, prosecute, trial and eventually 
condemn corrupt conducts. For instance, “[a]n increase in the number of corruption cases 
brought to trial could indicate a higher incidence of corruption, an increased level of confidence 
in the court, or both.” (June, Chowdhury, Heller, & Werve, 2008: 14)
Either because certain practices may have become a norm or because the judicial authorities 
demonstrate limited capacity or selective enforcement bias (Cazzola, 1988: 23) in dealing with 
complex crime, certain offences may go unreported and unrecorded in official statistics. These 
are the so-called “dark figures” of corruption (Piquero & Albanese, 2011: 194), a suspected 
volume of corruption that falls under the radar of judicial authorities, making official figures 
look discrepant with observable social practices and organizational risks. Detection let alone 
prosecution or conviction of corruption can be extraordinarily difficult given the complex and 
obscure nature of these illicit exchanges (De Sousa, 2002).
Therefore, crime statistics may tell more about the efficiency and efficacy of the judicial sphere 
in defining, uncovering and prosecuting acts of corruption than the volume of manifestations 
in a particular political or administrative system (Mény, 1992: 219). A country that displays 
high figures on corruption may not necessarily be indicative of being “more corrupt”, but more 
efficient in curbing its occurrence in society. 
Third, there is also a time gap between the occurrences of corrupt conducts and their 
prosecution and/or conviction. This will be inevitable reflected in the way crime statistics are 
coded and presented. The prosecution of corruption is not an easy or expeditious process and 
tends to become more complex when the offender is a political figure. Judicial proceedings can 































































last for many years until a final decision is reached, given the difficulty of gathering and 
interpreting evidence and the possibility of appeals suspending execution deadlines at different 
stages of the judicial proceedings thus delaying court’s final decision. This means that crime 
statistics will always display a hiatus between input and output objective indicators and 
therefore can only offer a very fragmented picture of the extension of corruption (as a criminal 
offence) in a given country.
Fourth, there is also a problem regarding the taxonomy of corruption as a criminal offence 
(Cazzola, 1988; De Sousa, 2002; Piquero & Albanese, 2011). Penal frameworks/laws vary 
across countries thus making it difficult to compare the volume of occurrences across different 
jurisdictions. When confronting statistical figures without paying due attention to the existing 
conceptual specificities of the offences, comparison (even if by juxtaposition) runs the risk of 
becoming spurious. The degree in which judicial action is framed will affect the extent in which 
crime statistics are more or less representative of those grey areas falling in the borderline of 
legality.
For all these reasons, attempts at developing cross-national measurements on corruption using 
official crime statistics have been systematically discredited (June et al., 2008: 14) or simply 
abandoned in favour of subjective approaches, which also have their limitations (Piquero & 
Albanese, 2011: 197). Nowadays, very few studies incorporate ‘objective measurement 
methodologies of corrupt activities’ (Brooks, Walsh, Lewis, & Kim, 2013: 28), despite recent 
noteworthy efforts (Escresa & Picci, 2017). Escresa and Picci (2017) have used judicial 
statistics on cross-border corruption, i.e. bribery between firms headquartered in a particular 
country and foreign public officials, to construct and compute a valid cross-national corruption 
index: the Public Administration Corruption Index (PACI).
Our approach regarding the usefulness of objective indicators provided by court records is 
slightly different. We are not interested in measuring corruption per se but interpreting ‘the way 































































corruption as a criminal offence has been treated through repressive instruments […] over a 
period of time’ by using court case narratives (De Sousa, 2002: 267). Court records are not just 
abstract statistics. These figures relate to concrete cases and judicial decisions that give detailed 
and objective indication as to who, what, when, where, why, and how the rules were broken 
(Chapman & Lindner 2016).
In this research note we attempt to explore the relevance of judicial materials. We focus on 
court cases to understand the sociology of corruption as a criminal offence, or to learn from the 
judicial system’s capacity to investigate, prosecute and trial reported occurrences. The data is 
available for open consultation at the Portuguese Archive of Social Information (APIS).4 
2. THE ANALYSIS AND CODING OF COURT CASES: A THREE-DIMENSIONAL 
APPROACH 
The analysis and respective coding of court cases is, by no means, simple or trivial. 
Systematically reading and coding texts, in order to identify consistent features and drawing 
inferences about their use and meaning are both time-consuming and expensive research tasks. 
The collection of court cases on a particular type of criminal offence is something that it is not 
within reach for most researchers, either because cases are not properly recorded and classified 
online and thus broadly available databases or, to a more limited extent, because some case-
law information is confidential and cannot be disclosed by law or by court rule.
The literature analysing the content of court cases and judicial opinions has grown considerably 
over the past forty years. US scholars have led the way. This approach has been used to study 
a broad range of issues in different legal subject areas (Hall & Wright, 2008: 70): (1) the 
4 Online access to the dataset, codebook and final report is available at: http://www.apis.ics.ulisboa.pt/en/































































creation of Lexis and Westlaw, the two largest databases on case law, statutes, codes, public 
records, law journals, legal treatises and other judicial documents; and (2) the development of 
computational tools and machine learning classifiers, which facilitated and automated the 
transcription, coding/labelling and interpretation of texts. 
Our study is a contribution to this line of research. The project included an analysis of 838 court 
cases on corruption and related offences recorded in First Instance Courts for the period 2004-
2008 in Portugal.
The two main objectives of this project were to advance knowledge about the way corruption 
and related offences are structured and operate in society and to draw inferences on the 
efficiency and efficacy of the judicial authorities in handling reported offences with the ultimate 
goal of improving and effecting control policies.
The data collected and coded enabled us to understand the reported crime of corruption and 
related offences at three levels of analysis:
[Figure 1 about here]
3. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
Before discussing selectively some of the results obtained in this study, it is useful to review 
some methodological aspects related to the collection and processing of information.
3.1. Case selection































































This dataset is the outcome of a pilot project commissioned by the Central Department of 
Criminal Investigation and Prosecution (CDCIP) of the Portuguese Attorney-General’s Office. 
Although the period covered (2004-2008) was determined by the project’s funding programme, 
it was nevertheless a very interesting time span to study corruption in Portugal, since it 
coincided with a set of changes in the legal provisions and instruments to fight corruption5 and 
the launching of a series of criminal investigations on political corruption and large scale 
banking fraud under the coordination of the CDCIP. Given that the CDCIP has access to all 
relevant cases from First Instance Courts, we counted with all the official cases, not having to 
deal with sampling biases. All court cases on corruption and similar offences recorded in First 
Instance Courts, from 2004 until 2008, were included in this database.
Nevertheless, we had to define a set of criteria for delimiting our universe of analysis. We 
included all processes, regardless of their procedural stage at the time of analysis (i.e. 
investigation, prosecution, instruction/pre-trial, trial, appeal or closure).
The universe of analysis covers information collected from court cases, available in the 
country’s 255 judicial counties organized in four districts6 – Lisbon, Oporto, Coimbra and 
Évora – annually for the years 2004 to 2008. A total of 838 court cases were considered (table 
1), distributed among the three types of criminal offences under scrutiny: corruption (active and 
passive), economic participation in business and embezzlement (illegal misappropriation or 
misuse of entrusted assets). In 141 cases, there were facts that integrated simultaneously two or 
three types of criminal offences.
5 Seventeen new projects of law on corruption were presented and debated in parliament during the 10th legislature (2005-2009), 
the highest number of draft bills registered so far. This period also coincided with the ratification of the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption. Several draft bills had to do with the transposition of international treaty provisions and other European Union 
legal norms in the domain of the fight against corruption.
6 With the Law 62/2013, of August 26 (Law of the Organization of the Judicial System), a new judicial map of Portugal was 
adopted. Under this new judicial reform, the former territorial organisation of courts was replaced by 23 new large judicial districts, 
which coincide, in most cases, with the existing administrative districts.































































[Table 1 about here]
For the period of analysis, the total number of complaints (979) showed the following 
distribution: 531 allegations of corruption, 43 of economic participation in business and 356 of 
embezzlement. With regard to the parties involved in the proceedings, a total of 941 defendants 
(natural and legal persons, active and passive) were enrolled. With regard to natural persons 
identified in the proceedings, it was decided to treat only those individuals formally constituted 
as defendants. In relation to legal persons, all parties were included, irrespective of whether or 
not they had been formally constituted as defendants, in order to overcome disparities resulting 
from the criminal liability regimes applicable to legal persons during the period under review. 
Since the penal responsibility of legal persons only came into force with the Law 59/2007, this 
would exclude from the universe of analysis all court cases in which companies had been 
involved prior to 2007.
Given that the study focused on the analysis of court cases on corruption and related criminal 
offences reported to First Instance Courts, it was necessary to clarify our object of analysis. In 
strict legal terms, an agent can only be considered to have committed a particular crime after a 
final and unappealable decision in a court of law. So, to avoid linguistic misunderstandings, 
when we use the term “corruption and related criminal offences” we are referring to 
occurrences/facts that gave rise to criminal proceedings. Public prosecutors come to knowledge 
of crime related facts by their own means, via reports from investigative and auditing authorities 
or as a result of public complaints (Article 241 of the Portuguese Criminal Procedure Code, 
henceforth CPC). This gives rise to the opening of an investigation by the Public Prosecutor 
(Article 262 CPC), which will then either dismiss the case or file an indictment. The case, if 































































instructed at the pre-trial phase, will then be brought to a trial stage, which will then result in 
either conviction or acquittal of the natural or legal persons charged.
3.2. The coding of cases
Three methodological steps were given consideration when coding the cases: the selection of 
indicators; the training of coders; and the actual coding of cases.
i) Selecting indicators
A tentative set of coding categories was created a priori through an iterative discussion with 
senior prosecutors and colleagues working in the field. The draft list of indicators (see Table 1 
below) focused on concrete case-law elements and the respective set of coding instructions. 
The multi-dimensional analytical framework adopted allowed to identify and classify, four 
types of information that could be obtained and coded from the court case narratives:
1) Information about the corrupt act – The characterization of the criminal act was based on 
the following variables: the date of the reported occurrence; the place where the corrupt 
exchange took place; the number of corrupt agents involved in the exchange; their motivations 
and objectives; the resources/amounts used or promised as inducements; the illicit advantages 
promised or obtained; the mode of engagement.
2) Information about the corrupt agents – The corrupt agents were grouped into four categories: 
active and passive legal person and active and passive natural person. The first categories refer 
to crimes allegedly committed by companies and public bodies; whereas the second to crimes 































































allegedly committed by individuals (private agents or office holders). Whereas for the first 
group, we coded information regarding the nature and type of organization, its mission and 
sector of activity, for the second group we retained all the necessary information that enabled 
us to characterise the corrupt agents according to standard sociographic variables.
3) Information about the complaint – Corruption, as a criminal offence, is a hidden pact. The 
reporting of facts conducive to criminal investigations is quintessential to the detection of 
corruption. In order to characterize the context or circumstance that gives rise to such public 
denunciation of criminal acts, we tried to retain procedural information about the complaint 
itself (where and to whom the complaint was filled, reason for the complaint, how the complaint 
was made, etc.).
4) Information on the dynamics of criminal proceedings – Lastly, the framework for analysis 
comprised a set of indicators relating to procedural dynamics, which enabled us to assess: the 
status of the case, i.e., with dated for various stages of the criminal proceedings; the reasons 
that led to case dismissal and acquittal in the First Instance courts; and the type of sanction 
applied.
ii) Training coders
Given the technical nature of the materials at hand, and in order to reinforce coding reliability, 
we opted to combine coding experience with legal expertise (Hall & Wright, 2008: 110).
The team of coders included four researchers with different disciplinary backgrounds – one 
principal researcher with legal training and three graduate students (two in sociology and one 
in political science) with coding practice and advanced knowledge in statistical methods – 































































working under the direct supervision of the two project coordinators, a CDCIP’s senior 
prosecutor and a research fellow in political science. 
Coders were given initial training to ensure a consistent categorisation of content. We also 
carried out regular meetings and a few reliability checks by asking the two researchers to code 
the same court cases, in order to assess whether they were interpreting and following the coding 
protocol in a consistent manner (Lacy, Watson, Riffe, & Lovejoy, 2015: 13).
iii) Coding
Cases were identified and coded by their court reference number. The cases were then classified 
according to three most expressive types of criminal offences under scrutiny (active and passive 
corruption, economic participation in business and embezzlement).
The court case narratives were read, interpreted and coded according to the following analytical 
framework (table 2):
[Table 2 about here]
Since most indicators concerned only factual information on the attributes of the corrupt 
exchange and on specific procedural aspects, not covering issues pertaining to legal doctrine or 
judicial method, tracking down this information and classifying it according to the codebook 
was a lengthy task with few difficulties. 
4. THE ANALYSIS OF CASES CODED: MOST RELEVANT FINDINGS































































There are two main types of data that may be extracted and analysed from these datasets: (1) 
general information (descriptive) of the volume and distribution of corruption and related 
criminal offences; and (2) systematized and codified information resulting from the 
interpretation of court case narratives.
The first dataset maps the distribution of court cases on corruption and similar offences over 
time, jurisdictionally (across judicial districts and counties), and by sector of activity of the 
passive and active corrupt agents. 
The second dataset provides systematized and codified information that enables to (1) 
understand corruption as a criminal offence (its context, actors, resources, and mechanisms of 
exchange); and (2) highlight specific issues regarding the dynamics of criminal proceedings, 
such as the average duration of investigations, the type of reporting practices and the extent to 
which these are likely to impact on procedural efficiency and judicial outcomes. 
Our main descriptive findings illustrate the relevance of this type of datasets for a knowledge-
based and integrated corruption control policy approach.
4.1. The volume and distribution of corruption and related crimes
Almost all cases of corruption and related criminal offences in Portugal concern illegal 
exchanges between the public and private spheres. This finding came as no surprise, since the 
OECD has systematically criticized Portuguese judicial authorities for not clarifying and using 
the corporate liability provisions to fight corruption under the 1997 OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.7
7 OECD (2015) Portugal: Follow-Up to the Phase 3 report & Recommendations. November 2015. Available online: 































































Financial impropriety deriving from a conflict of interest (crime of “economic participation in 
business by a public official”) and facilitation payments (crime of “corruption for a lawful 
conduct”) are practically non-existent. In the first case, this may be related to the way this 
criminal offence is framed and in the second case, it is probably a consequence of the high 
degree of social tolerance in relation to this practice, as demonstrated by a survey study on 
corruption and ethics in public life conducted to a sample of the Portuguese population in 2006 
(De Sousa & Triães, 2008).
We were also able to observe an increase in criminal offences with lower complexity such as 
embezzlement, which is often more easily detectable by forensic audits in detriment of more 
complex cases of corruption or financial impropriety. This observation seems to contradict 
prima facie the hypothesis of improved repressive capacity in dealing with this type of 
criminality.
It was possible to observe a north-south divide regarding the jurisdictional distribution of cases 
by type of crime (figure 2).
[Figure 2 about here]
Notwithstanding the judicial map does not coincide with the political map of the country, it still 
is observable an uneven distribution of corruption cases across the 308 municipalities (Figure 
2). The lighter areas are those with higher incidence of corruption. A quick overview of the 
data distribution across the whole map suggests that the northwest municipalities are those most 
targeted by corruption. However, if we take a closer look at the data, it becomes clearer that the 
municipalities with higher incidence of corruption cases are coincidental with two largest cities: 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Portugal-Phase-3-Written-Follow-Up-Report-ENG.pdf (accessed on January 14, 2019).































































Lisbon, with 78 cases, and Oporto, with 72 cases. This is not surprising for two reasons: (1) the 
distribution of resources and expertise across the prosecutor’s offices is uneven, with a greater 
specialization on complex crimes concentrated in the prosecutor offices of Lisbon, Porto and 
Coimbra; and (2) these two metropolitan areas concentrate the higher percentage of public 
officials, population  and businesses.
The two judicial districts of the north and centre of Portugal, i.e., Oporto and Coimbra 
respectively, displayed the highest number of cases of corruption, while the two judicial 
districts of the South, Lisbon and Évora, registered the highest number of cases of 
embezzlement. We are not in a position to gauge whether or not this trend is verifiable over 
time, but it is an interesting pattern that must be interpreted in conjunction with other 
governance indicators, such as the quality of regulatory frameworks. Much of the corruption 
cases that took place in the metropolitan area of Oporto, involved municipalities and 
construction companies and had to do with rapid urban sprawl and land management policies. 
The fact that embezzlement figures are higher in Lisbon could be related to the fact that most 
central administration services and public companies are located in this metropolitan area. But 
these are mere speculative conjectures.
4.2. The anatomy of corruption and related crimes
The sociographic profile of the individual actors was not indicative of any pattern or prevalent 
feature that would allow the construction of a “facial composite” of the corrupt agent. 
According to our dataset, the passive corrupt agent has the profile of a common citizen and this 
is valid for all types of criminal offences analysed. Nevertheless, some patterns were identified 
that may be worth exploring in future studies: the majority of defendants were middle-aged 
male employees, with a permanent position and some decisional power. Corruption is an abuse 
of entrusted power, often of a decisional nature. Hence, it is not surprising that those public 































































officials with discretionary and concentrated decisional capacity on the interpretation of norms 
and allocation of goods and services, in a context of poor supervision and organizational ethics 
(Klitgaard, 1988), may seek to take their chances and act illegally. Abrupt changes in the 
lifestyle of the defendant were one of the reasons for engaging in rent-seeking behaviour. 
Individuals more exposed to household financial impairments were also more likely to act 
corruptly.
Court data also allowed us to gauge the areas or sectors of activity more exposed to corruption 
risks. Generally speaking, these tend to be those areas or sectors characterized by high levels 
of informality and clientelism, high profitability ratios deriving from political decisions, 
unbalanced supply-demand of decisional goods and services, disorganized and fragmented 
regulation, low levels of transparency and insufficient or misguided supervision.
During the period under review, most occurrences were related to corruption cases involving 
small monetary exchanges (below EUR 1,500 for almost 40% of cases). There were, however, 
some cases of greater complexity, involving amounts above EUR 50,000. Most corrupt acts 
resulted from state-market interactions and were pursued by the legal representative of an 
organization with the intent to obtain or retain business or a competitive advantage. For the 
majority of case analysed (52.5%), the private agent was the initiator of the corrupt exchange, 
which seems to confirm the indication by victimisation surveys that the problem of corruption 
in Portugal does not result from predatory practices by public officials.
Most bribery exchanges are pursued in a reserved context that ensures anonymity to both parties 
to the transaction, but in more complex cases, some degree of socialisation between the actors 
was needed before sealing the pact. Meetings outside the workplace often took place discretely 
in selective restaurants and bars or more openly in places of mass concentration of people, such 
as shopping malls, due to the functional anonymity they offer to the parties involved.































































4.3. Evidence on judiciary performance
The data suggests a pattern of judiciary performance across a large number of cases without 
necessarily raising a discussion of the legal doctrine and judicial reasoning that presided the 
court’s decision for each case in particular. Accordingly, most interventions were not initiated 
as a result of a risk assessment or forensic audit, which means that repression is reactive, 
casuistic, dependent on whistleblowing as a source of information and detached from 
prevention.
Most corruption allegations were reported anonymously, without documentary support, thus 
partly explaining the high rates of case dismissal. Whistleblowing is largely dependent on the 
degree of tolerance towards corruption in a given society and/or organisational context as well 
as the adequacy of reporting mechanisms. The way in which the judicial system collects, and 
processes complaints offers very few guarantees of protection to whistle-blowers. The judicial 
authorities encourage the complainants to file written and identifiable statements in order to 
avoid being charged with slander. Fearing reprisals, complainants opt to send anonymous letters 
to the authorities with insufficient evidence (De Sousa & Triães 2008).
Most cases were closed without further action (53.1%). Only a handful led to conviction (6.9%) 
and fewer led to an effective prison sentence. Although other facto s may concur to the 
explanation of the poor record of condemnation of corruption-related offences in Portugal, the 
inadequacy of reporting practices and procedures appears to be a relevant determinant. In fact, 
the court narratives confirm that in cases where the complaint is complemented by 
documentary, audio, video and photographic evidences collected by special investigative means 
(such as lawful interception of communications, computer forensics, access to bank accounts, 
letters rogatory to foreign jurisdictions), the subsequent production of proof in court is more 
effective.































































The data also shows that cases reported from inside the organisation where the offence takes 
place are likelier to reach the trial phase, thus reinforcing the need for diversifying and 
strengthening reporting mechanisms and procedures and the guarantees to those who are willing 
to collaborate with the auditing and investigative authorities.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This research note introduces a novel dataset on corruption court cases in Portugal. The policy 
significance of this dataset is threefold: (1) it provides decision-makers a more detailed 
mapping of the volume and distribution of corruption and related offences across the country 
than that provided by standard judicial statistics; (2) it fosters knowledge on key sociological 
aspects of the corrupt fact, thus helping decision-makers to understand better the type of actors, 
objectives, contexts, resources and exchanges involved; (3) it helps to understand the dynamics 
of judicial proceedings and how certain procedural and institutional features impact on 
outcomes.
The dataset offers a unique characterisation of the legal offences from formal complains to their 
indictment in first instance courts; hence it looks at specific factual elements within legal texts 
that enable to discern patterns across cases.
There are limits as to how much can we infer about the efficiency and efficacy of the judicial 
system in addressing corruption and similar offences through an analysis of the court cases. 
This type of analysis does not enable to distil and interpret the legal principles and judicial 
method a case embodies. For such a fine-grained analysis we suggest a case study approach of 
selective court cases covering in more detail the judicial method and argumentative techniques 































































used, the normative sources cited and the interpretations of the social relevance of the offence(s) 
expressed in the final decisions. 
The academic and policy relevance of empirical studies on court case narratives, in particular 
judicial decisions, is known and has largely been discussed in the literature (Jordan, 1998): not 
only it produces descriptive information about what type of corruption related offences the 
judicial system is able to detect, prosecute and trial; it also provides useful insights of judicial 
performance and procedural dynamics that help to tentatively answer bigger policy questions 
and uncover issues for further research.
This type of analysis is of particular importance for judicial authorities or specialised anti-
corruption agencies with investigative and/ inquiry coordination competences since it treats in 
a systematic manner relevant qualitative information about the crime of corruption and related 
offences that official statistics fail to capture, taking as its starting point the criminal 
proceedings, relegating to the background fruitless discussions about the “actual” volume of 
corruption. Firstly, the data enables judicial authorities to enhance their investigative, 
coordination and prevention capacity by offering case-by-case statistical information on 
corruption and related offences. Secondly, it is also useful for reporting purposes, both 
internally and externally, in response to specific requests for criminal information from 
international bodies and foreign judicial cooperation arrangements. Thirdly, it fosters the 
production of policy-oriented scientific knowledge for repression and prevention purposes. Last 
but not least, it helps to raise standards of transparency and accountability of the judiciary and 
contribute, when complemented with a proactive communication and educational strategy, to 
enhance the public’s understanding and trust in the judicial system.
The dataset has been used by recent studies on corruption. Stockemer & Calca (2013) used 
some of the variables of this dataset to study the relationship between turnout and corruption at 
the municipal level. Lima (2011), using a subsample of 345 criminal proceedings and 352 































































defendants presented to the courts between 2004 and 2008, explored the anatomy of corruption 
in local government. 
We believe that this type of data collection, treatment and analysis should be encouraged across 
European Union Member States, where there has been an unprecedented effort of 
harmonization of penal norms and convergence of judicial performance, and other territorial 
areas. Such data would enable policymakers to have a better understanding of the nature of 
corruption as a crime as well as the efficiency of the judicial system in detecting, prosecuting, 
judging and eventually condemning its occurrence, thus contributing to restoring citizens’ 
confidence in the rule of law as well as strengthening the Member States’ governance reputation 
and the fair operation of the internal market.
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